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ABSTRACT
Botnets and malware continue to avoid detection by static rules
engines when using domain generation algorithms (DGAs) for call-
outs to unique, dynamically generated web addresses. Common
DGA detection techniques fail to reliably detect DGA variants that
combine random dictionary words to create domain names that
closely mirror legitimate domains. To combat this, we created a
novel hybrid neural network, Bilbo the bagging model, that anal-
yses domains and scores the likelihood they are generated by such
algorithms and therefore are potentially malicious. Bilbo is the
rst parallel usage of a convolutional neural network (CNN) and a
long short-term memory (LSTM) network for DGA detection. Our
unique architecture is found to be the most consistent in perfor-
mance in terms of AUC, F1 score, and accuracy when generalising
across dierent dictionary DGA classication tasks compared to
current state-of-the-art deep learning architectures. We validate
using reverse-engineered dictionary DGA domains and detail our
real-time implementation strategy for scoring real-world network
logs within a large enterprise 1. In four hours of actual network
trac, the model discovered at least ve potential command-and-
control networks that commercial vendor tools did not ag.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Malware continues to pose a serious threat to individuals and corpo-
rations alike [33]. Typical aack methods such as viruses, phishing
emails, and worms aempt to retrieve private user data, destroy
systems, or start unwanted programs. e majority of these aacks
may be launched through the network [31], posing a major threat
to any Internet-facing device. Some malware reaches out to a com-
mand and control (C&C) centre hosted behind domains generated
by an algorithm (DGA domains) aer it inltrates the target sys-
tem to receive further instructions. Identication of such domains
in network trac allows for the detection of malware-infected
machines.
A single active DGA has been seen generating up to a few hun-
dred domains per day [33]. At scale within a company, this is
infeasible for a human analyst to triage amidst the thousands of
1 is work was done while working at Capital One in 2017-18 and is based on public
talks we gave in 2018.
benign domains occurring simultaneously. Automated detection
systems are developing but the sightings of DGAs in worms, bot-
nets, and other malicious seings is growing [1].
In addition, malware that employs DGAs intentionally obfus-
cates its network communication by utilising random seeds when
generating their domains [1, 27, 31, 33, 51]. Most known DGAs com-
bine randomly-selected characters like “myypqmvzkgnrf[.]com”,
“otopshphtnhml[.]net”, and “uqhucsontf[.]com” 2.
However, DGAs that combine random words from a dictio-
nary like “milkdustbadliterally[.]com”, “couragenearest[.]net”, and
“boredlaptopaorney[.]ru” [13] aremeaningfully harder for humans
to detect (see Table 1 for comparison). In this paper, we will refer
to this type of DGA as a dictionary DGA and focus on those using
dictionaries composed of English words.
Common defences against malicious DGA domains include black-
lists [23, 26], random forest classiers [3, 50, 55], and clustering
techniques [8, 32]. When the lists are well maintained and the fea-
tures are chosen carefully, these methods have acceptable ecacy.
However, both blacklists and these models possess serious limita-
tions: relying on hand-picked features which are time-consuming
to develop, lacking the ability to generalise with the fewmanual fea-
tures implemented, and requiring continuous expert maintenance.
More comprehensive tactics are necessary to detect incessant new
DGAs stemming from network-based malware.
Recent innovations using deep learning have state-of-the-art
accuracy on DGA detection. Such models are highly exible with
the proven success in complex language problems. ey do not
require hand-craed features that are time-intensive to make and
easy to evade. Woodbridge et al. [50] were the rst to present a
long short-term memory (LSTM) network for DGA classication.
Other architectures were later applied, such as further variations on
an LSTM [4, 28, 46, 48, 55], a convolutional neural network (CNN)
[38, 58], and a hybrid CNN-LSTM model [56]. Although successful
for random-character DGA domains, these classiers have largely
been ineective in identifying dictionary DGA domains. ese
models also perform well on their various testing sets but their
performance can suer when aempting to generalise to new DGA
families or new versions of previously seen families.
Against this background, we present a novel deep learning model
for dictionary DGA detection. is advances the state of the art
in the following ways. First, we present the rst usage of parallel
CNN and LSTM hybrid for DGA detection, specically applied to
2For the rest of this paper, all domain URLs will be referred to with [.] to prevent
automatically assigning these domains as real URLs one might click.
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dictionary DGA detection. e model is trained on standard large-
scale datasets of reverse-engineered dictionary DGA domains. It
achieves the most consistent success at dictionary DGA classica-
tion amongst state-of-the-art deep learning architectures for clas-
sication, generalisability, and time-based resiliency. Second, we
detail our insights into dictionary DGA domains’ inter-relationships
and their eect on generalisability of models as an outcome. ird,
we validate our model on live network trac in a large nancial
institution. In four hours of logs, it discovered ve potential C&C
networks that commercial vendor tools did not ag. Finally, we
detail our scalable implementation strategy within the security
context of a corporation for real-time analysis.
2 BACKGROUND
An ever-growing number of malware rely on communication with
C&C channels to receive instructions and system-specic code [33].
e destination (domain or IP address) of this channel can be hard-
coded in the malware itself, making its location discoverable via
reverse engineering or straightforward log aggregation techniques.
Once known, this domain or IP address can be blacklisted, rendering
the malware inert. To avoid this single point of failure, malware
authors employ domain uxing, inwhich the destination of the C&C
communication changes systematically as the aacker registers new
domains to the C&C hub.
e key tomalware domain uxing is the use of unique and likely
unregistered domains that are known to the aacker but can blend
in to regular trac. To accomplish this, malware families employ
domain generation algorithms (DGAs) to create pseudo-random
domains for use in communication. ese domains are used for
short periods of time and then phased out for newly-generated
domains; this quick turnover means that manual techniques are
not eective. Additionally, reverse engineering these algorithms
may be slow or impossible if the malware is encrypted. For the vast
majority of malware samples, trac related to malicious activity
is present in networks weeks or months before the malware is
analysed and blacklisted [26].
To prevent DGA-based malware from exltrating, disabling, or
tampering with assets, institutions must detect malicious trac as
soon as possible. roughout this paper we will discuss our solution
while keeping in mind that it must be practical, operating in real-
time, enriching contextual data within in true threat environments.
2.1 Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs)
DGA usage spans a variety of cases, from benign resource gen-
eration to phishing campaigns and the management of botnets,
groups of machines that have been infected by malware, such as
Kraken [37], Concker [34, 35], Murofet [42], and others [52]. e
goal of all DGAs is to generate domains that do not already exist
and, for malicious cases, will not be agged by vendor security
tools or analysts. To accomplish this, DGA authors typically use ei-
ther character-based or dictionary-based pseudo-random assembly
process to form domains.
Each method has benets and downfalls. Character-based DGA
domains are more likely to not be registered. But to a human
security analyst, gibberish domains made from character-based
DGAs stand out from human-craed domains due to their phonetic
Table 1: Examples of domains from our training data, com-
prised of domains from the Alexa Top 1 Million list and do-
mains generated by dictionary-based DGA families (discov-
ered through reverse engineering) from DGArchive.
Legitimate Malicious
microsoft lookhurt
linkedin threetold
paypal threewear
steamcommunity pielivingbytes
dailymotion awardsbookcasio
stackoverflow blanketcontent
facebook degreeblindagent
soundcloud mistakelivegarage
implausibility and lack of known words within them. ere is a
visible unique paern underlying character DGA domains, such as
“lrluiologistbikerepil”, that dictionary DGA domains, like “record-
kidneyestablishmen”, do not follow. Dictionary DGA domains are
more challenging to detect when scanning logs because they are
pronounceable, contain known words, and mirror the character
distribution of legitimate English domains [7]. See similarities be-
tween known dictionary DGA domains and benign domains in
Table 1.
DGA detection systems have been implemented to assist in high-
lighting DGA domains for further investigation. ese have largely
been tailored towards character-based DGAs. Character-based
DGAs are more common: of 43 known reverse-engineered DGAs
available in DGArchive [13], 40 of them use a seed to pseudo-
randomly assemble characters or a word surrounded by random
characters to form a domain name. Most methods for generic DGA
analysis still struggle to identify dictionary-based DGA malware
families because they classify all DGAs rather than focusing on
specic algorithms.
is paper will focus on classifying the largest available sets
of known dictionary DGA domains: gozi [25], matsnu [44], and
suppobox [14]. Each varies in the dictionary-based domain gener-
ation tactic, the length of the domain, and the dictionary corpus.
ese dictionary DGA families are oen undetected by methods
proposed in prior research aimed at general DGA detection be-
cause of the large number of families available for other types of
DGAs. By targeting where others are weaker, our model can pro-
vide greater coverage when used in conjunction with generic DGA
models and other contextual information for increased condence
in identication.
Much of prior DGA research has involved making lookups into
historical or related domain name server (DNS) records. Such meth-
ods oen rely on signals aained from Non-Existent Domain (NX-
Domain) responses when unregistered domains are queried. Since
DGAs oen generate hundreds of domains per day and at most
only a few of those domains are actually registered by the aacker,
large numbers of these requests result in NXDomains. Many NX-
Domain responses from the same computer are unlikely to result
from expected user behaviour, and thus this paern of DNS trac
can be associated with DGA activity [8, 22, 52].
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However, such queries within high-volume DNS log data can
be prohibitively slow and unsuitable for real-time decision-making
needed to reduce the risk of compromise. It is for this reason that
our model considers limited data, only the domain name, rather
than all of the potential elds given through standard network log-
ging. We also only use open source datasets rather than restricted
NXDomain lists for reproducibility and to provide an accessible
starting point for others looking to tailor this system to their own
environment.
2.2 Related Work
Defensive tactics began analysing network logs with statistical or
manually selected features instead of static blacklisting or rules
when it became overwhelming to maintain them. Unsupervised
probabilistic ltering [36] and random forest models [3, 39] were
some of the leading systems for detecting DGAs.
Future techniques included more contextual information which
improved the longevity of detection systems. Clustering [51, 52,
59], Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [8], random forests models
[40, 47, 53], and sequential hypothesis testing [22] used data such
as WHOIS or NXDomain responses with the domain to identify
DGAs. However, a number of these techniques require batches of
live data to maintain relevancy or high volumes of data which are
not typically feasible in real-time environments.
Deep learning rst addressed DGA detectionwithwork byWood-
bridge et al. [50], an implementation of an LSTM used for nonspe-
cic DGA analysis. eir experiments show that their deep learning
approach, an LSTM network, outperforms a character-level HMM
and a random forest model that utilise features such as the entropy
of character distribution. eir analysis and implementation led to
a large success for identifying most DGA families; however, their
LSTM did not score highly on suppobox or matsnu, dictionary DGA
families.
Since then others have joined the eld, implementing a variety
of deep learning models. Several took the LSTM model from Wood-
bridge et al. and provided improvements. Tran et al. [46] took the
native class imbalance of DGA data into account. Others updated
the training data with other known DGA datasets [4, 55] or added
more contextual information to the score [11]. Another altered the
original architecture of their LSTM to a bi-directional LSTM layer
[28], demonstrating the potential enhancements of changing the
model’s architecture.
When a CNN was applied to text classication [18, 19, 57] and
showed success over an LSTM on some tasks [54, 58], it was eventu-
ally applied tomalicious URL analysis [38]. Other approaches to this
problem include a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), showing
that the arms race for DGA detection could advance on its own [7].
Recent work combining CNN convolutions and LSTM temporal pro-
cessing into new sequential hybrid models have also been brought
to this problem [10, 20, 30, 56]. Other comparative works have been
published aempting to nalise which model is the best for DGA
detection [9, 12, 29, 43, 55, 56]. eir evaluations state deep learning
maintains greater success over random forest models trained using
manually-selected features, but do not consider the greater context
of the model’s deployment or implementation environment. Our
research picks up this work, systematically evaluating deep learn-
ing architectures to specically target where most DGA detection
systems consistently underperform: dictionary DGAs.
Koh et al. were one of the rst to train deep learning to speci-
cally target dictionary DGA domains [21]. Utilising a pre-trained
embedding for the words within the domain, they trained an LSTM
both on single-DGA and multiple-DGA data sets. While their re-
sults set the bar for dictionary DGA detection, their model had
severe limitations from its context-sensitive word embedding on
what it could learn and they did not use all available data during
training and testing. Another related work on dictionary DGA
detection is WordGraph from Pereira et al. [32]. ey take large
batches of NXDomains and the longest common substring (LCS) of
every pair within the set, connecting any co-occurring LCS within a
single domain name to construct their WordGraph. e dictionary
DGA domains are shown to cluster whereas benign domains have
no discernible paern and is shown to generalise over changes to
the DGA’s dictionary. A random forest classier is trained on the
paerns between domains to identify dictionary DGA paerns. is
method shows promise at adapting to dierent DGAs. However, it
is too computationally intensive for many systems to support for
only domain name analysis.
2.3 Real-Time Deployment Environment
Within a large corporation with thousands of employees, security
tools struggle to assist analysts aempting to monitor corporate
assets. Analysts investigating anomalous activity use a variety of
lters to limit the data they need to consider before nalising a
verdict on any given activity. We assume other lters for response
type, network protocol, NXDomain results, proxy labels, etc. are
also included. Scores from a model for dictionary DGA detection
would be added into the system for analysts to include whichever
additional information they deem necessary.
Much like the work by Kumar et al. [24] and Vinayakumar et
al. [48], we aim to not only address this cyber security issue with
text classication techniques, but also the greater system in which
the model would be deployed. Prior systems consider the various
model performance metrics on common data sets as well as the real-
world generalisability, response time, and scalability of their chosen
model when scoring domains in real time. We extend their work
to new controlled tests and describe deploying detection systems
within a corporate environment.
3 BILBO THE ”BAGGING” HYBRID MODEL
We present a new deep learning model to deploy for real-time
dictionary DGA classication. As mentioned before, deep learning
architectures are capable of learning variations to dictionaries and
DGAs, with the added benet of training quickly. ere have been
many deep learning architectures published for this task for state-
of-the-art comparison.
Since we can treat domains as sequences of characters, LSTM
models are a natural t for classifying DGA domains. LSTM nodes
make decisions about one element in the sequence based on what
it has seen earlier in the sequence. us, LSTM nodes learn pa-
rameters that are shared across the elements of sequence. is
parameter sharing allows LSTMs to scale to handle much longer
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Figure 1: High-level architecture of Bilbo; the component
models are highlighted in blue. Raw domains are input and
encoded into sequences before being passed to the separate
LSTMandCNNarchitectures. e features extracted by each
of these component architectures are sent to a single layer
ANN or a hidden layer, which is then attened to produce
the output, a single score.
sequences than would be practical for traditional feedforward neu-
ral networks [16]. For example, an LSTM neuron might recall that
it has seen seven vowels in a nine-character domain, making it
unlikely that the domain is made up of natural English text. is
sequential specialisation of LSTMs aracted us initially, but we
found it alone could not generalise to new dictionary DGAs as well
as other architectures.
Others have applied CNNs in various forms since used for URL
analysis by Saxe et al. [38]. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
were designed to handle information that is in a grid format, such
as pixels in an image matrix. By treating text as a one-dimensional
grid of leers, CNNs were shown to have excellent results for natu-
ral language tasks [19, 57]. We translate domain names to arrays
of characters, allowing the CNN to examine local relationships
between characters via a sliding window, thus grouping characters
together into words. For example, the domain “facebook” can be
broken down into four-character windows: “face”, “aceb”, “cebo”,
“eboo”, and “book”. By dividing character arrays into smaller, re-
lated parts in this manner, CNNs demonstrated success on URL
classication tasks [38].
When multiple models perform well on the same task, many
practitioners have combined models or model architectures to en-
hance the various benets they individually provide. e most
common technique is to combine pre-trained models to form an
ensemble model, where each individual model produces a score and
these scores are combined in some way to produce a new score. In
this context we could train a general DGA classier that combines
one model trained to classify character DGA domains and another
trained to classify dictionary DGA domains. e benet of combin-
ing both models is dependent on how they are combined and how
it decides which model to “trust” for its nal decision without the
context of how they were developed.
Hybrid models are similar to ensemble models, but rather than
taking the individual score from each component, a hybrid model
combines the architectures before the extracted features are reduced
to a single score. ese models are trained as a single end-to-end
model. A hybrid architecture allows the model to learn which
combinations of features of the input are signicant indicators
for accurate classication. Most common hybrid models combine
architectures by stacking them in dierent ways. For instance,
using a CNN’s convolutional layer to extract features and then feed
them into an LSTM layer [10, 20, 30, 49, 56].
Our novel hybrid model, as seen in Figure 1, processes domain
names via an LSTM layer and a CNN layer in parallel. e outputs
of these two architectures are then aggregated or “bagged” by a
single-layer ANN. is “bagging” is a vital opportunity for this
model to discern which parts of the captured information from the
LSTM and CNN assists the best when labelling dictionary DGA
and benign domains. Inserting an ANN instead of a single function
increases the potential optimisation of the “bagging”. Because
of the importance of this piece in the architecture, we named our
model Bilbo the ”bagging” model. Unlike ensembles which optimise
its components prior to conjoining, hybrids optimise over all the
components. As demonstrated in our results (Section 6), Bilbo
successfully combines LSTM, CNN, and ANN layers for dictionary
DGA detection and is the best at consistently classifying dictionary
DGAs amongst state-of-the-art deep learning models.
Figure 2: Comparing the shared largest common substrings
fromwithin each domain family considered during our clas-
sication (alexa, suppobox, gozi, and matsnu). e circumfer-
ence is grouped by colour for each family. e counts are for
the number of times the overlapping LCS was an LCS for a
domain pair within a given family. Note that any overlap in
the centre has no meaning and the counts contain overlap
between LCS shared between one pair of families and any
other.
4 DATA ANALYSIS
To beer understand the success and failures of the models used in
our tests, we conducted a brief analysis of our data set of known
dictionary DGAs. e dictionary DGA domains were selected from
collections of related DGAs, called DGA families, published on
DGArchive [13], a trusted database of domains extracted from
reverse-engineered DGA malware. From this source, several fami-
lies of DGAs were empirically identied as solely dictionary DGAs
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based on the structure of the domain names generated by malware
samples. e families selected were suppobox, gozi, and matsnu
with domains collected over two years (2016-17) by DGArchive.
Aer removing duplicate domain names, the resulting selection
contained 137, 745 samples of suppobox, 18, 539 samples of matsnu,
and 20, 313 samples of gozi.
e legitimate domains in the training set originate from the
Alexa Top 1 Million domains, measured in 2016 [5]. e Alexa list
ranks domains by the number of times each has been accessed. Since
DGA-based malware tends to use domains for short periods of time,
we assume that top Alexa domain names are human-generated and
label them as non-DGA. ese popular domains, mostly containing
valid English words, encourage the model to learn characteristics of
legitimate combinations of English words. We randomly sampled
an equivalent number of domains from Alexa to match the total
number of dictionary DGA samples available.
To further understand our data, we conducted several compar-
isons:
(1) By extracting the longest common substrings within each
family, compare the lists between families for dictionary
similarity. See Figure 2 for a summary of those results
(2) Using the widely adapted Jaro-Winkler algorithm for string
similarity [15], we compared every domain in our data set
within their own families and with every other family. e
histogram in Figure 3 shows us how similar families are
and how this could inuence the results for generalisability.
4.1 Longest Common Substring (LCS)
e application of this algorithm was inspired by Pereira et al.’s
technique for dictionary extraction [32]. We applied this to each
individual group (alexa, suppobox, gozi, and matsnu) to generate
a list of every LCS between pairs of domains. ese lists contain
all possible dictionary words used to generate the domains. By
comparing the lists between the families, we can see how learning
one family’s list could assist in identifying the other. Figure 2
visualises the overlap between sets with a chord diagram.
e circumference is partitioned into four parts and is labelled
with the count for the number of times overlapping substrings were
seen as the LCS for a domain pair within its family. For instance,
look at the black vertical chord between gozi and alexa. e colour
black means that alexa, the family assigned black, is the smaller
portion of this relationship, i.e. fewer of its LCS (approximately
10 million) are within the overlap with gozi (approximately 100
million).
LCS overlapping between alexa and gozi also include LCS from
other overlaps. gozi’s large partition of the circumference while
also being the smallest family means it overlaps frequently with
other groups. Overall matsnu and gozi have the largest overlap,
sharing 8.6% of their LCS and 92% of their LCS when including the
number of times it was seen as the LCS of a pair. e longest LCS
between them was 14 characters; the average length for LCS was
4.238 characters. erefore, there must be only a few very common
substrings between the families, which deep learning models could
learn.
4.2 Jaro-Winkler (JW) Score
To understand the similarity of an entire domain string with any
other domain, we used the JW score [15]. is algorithm takes
the ordering of the characters and the collection of characters to
develop a score between [0,1]. e closer the score is to one, the
more similar the domains are to one another. We compared every
domain to generate diagrams such as Figure 3.
Most families follow the same distribution with a mean of about
0.5 for JW score. However, notice the slight skew in alexa and
suppobox. Due to a large percentage of their domains having lit-
tle to no JW similarity, the average score for alexa was 0.4023
and suppobox was 0.4901. is slight dierence is amplied when
considering other aspects of the family. Both suppobox and alexa
have the smallest average lengths of domains at 13 and 9 characters,
respectively. Both groups have a standard deviation of approxi-
mately four characters and most frequent length of about eight
characters. With this, the low JW scores for alexa and suppobox
make sense with shorter domains.
e other sets, matsnu and gozi, are much longer in comparison
with most frequent lengths of 14 and 23 characters, respectively.
e dictionary for their DGAs seems to select from shorter, 3-5-
character words. Since there are less possible combinations of valid
short words, more overlap between gozi and matsnu, which is also
apparent in Figure 2.
is exploratory data analysis helped us develop an intuition
around how dierent dictionary DGAs relate to each other and
gave us hope that models would pick up on these relationships
even though most of these families use dierent dictionaries and
generation algorithms. Also, this same analysis should prove useful
when comparing and expanding the model with other dictionary
DGA families as they emerge.
Figure 3: Histogram of the Jaro-Winkler scores of each dic-
tionary DGA family and Alexa. A distribution line was
drawn over it to assist in tracing the trends of the scores.
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5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We frame the DGA detection problem as a binary text classication
task on only the domain string. e score provided by ourmodel can
then be used independently or be enriched with additional security
context. In this section, tests are designed on known labelled data
to demonstrate the baseline performance of each model. ese
experiments reect practitioner concerns on model deployments
within real-world context:
(1) Testing the model’s ability to do binary classication with
of benign and dictionary DGA domains
(2) Evaluating the model’s generalisability for identifying un-
seen dictionary DGAs
(3) Examining the model’s scores as the dictionaries and DGAs
evolve over time, how well can the model classify new
dictionary DGA domains from known families
We compare Bilbo to four deep learning models: a single-layer
ANN, CNN, LSTM, and MIT’s CNN-LSTM Hybrid [49, 56]. Each
is based o of state-of-the-art models for DGA classication; the
implementation for each is described below. Our results highlight
the strengths and weaknesses of each architecture in the dierent
scenarios.
5.1 Testing
Each experiment uses data pulled from the Alexa Top 1 Million list
[5] and DGArchive [13]. e only three available dictionary DGA
families are considered: gozi, matsnu, and suppobox. For model
training and validation, the data is always separated into three
sets: training, testing, and holdout. Training and testing are used
at every epoch to see if early stopping should occur, preventing
overing. e results for each metric, listed in Section 6, are from
applying the model to the holdout set.
5.1.1 Testing Classification. e rst test evaluates how the
model performs for binary classication between benign (nega-
tives) and dictionary DGA domains (positives). With a balanced
dataset, 80% was used for training the model. e remaining 20%
(approximately 60,000 domains) was randomly sampled to use for
testing and holdout: 50,000 domains for testing the model at each
epoch and 10,000 domains for validating the model aer training
was completed. All training, testing, and validation data sets con-
tained an approximately equal number of positives and negatives.
5.1.2 Testing Generalisability. is test evaluates how the model
generalises to unseen dictionary DGAs. For this, three trials are
created from the data sorted by dictionary DGA family. Each trial
takes two of the families for training and splits the third over testing
and holdout. For example, one variant uses matsnu and suppobox
domains to train the model while evaluating the model’s perfor-
mance using gozi domains. is paper is the rst to test DGA
detection models in this way.
5.1.3 Testing Time-based Resiliency. DGAs have been found to
evolve over time, varying their generation algorithms slightly or
using entirely new dictionaries [24]. While our tests for gener-
alisability highlight some of the deep learning models’ ability to
classify alterations in the dictionary DGA, they are limited by our
scope of sampling in 2016-17.
To test detection system’s resiliency on future versions of dictio-
nary DGA domains, we evaluate our models trained on data from
2016-17 with DGA samples from November 2019. Models trained
on all three dictionary DGA families are applied to this dataset.
5.2 Implementation of Deep Learning Models
Deep learning models take numerical sequences as input. us,
every domain string is encoded as an array of integers and then
paddedwith zeros to ensure that all inputs are of the same size. Each
Unicode character is mapped to an integer through a constructed
list of 40 valid domain-name characters. For example, “google”
would be converted to [7, 15, 15, 7, 12, 5] and padded with
zeros at the beginning to get all inputs up to our maximum length of
a domain string: 63 characters. Our nal input is [0, 0, ..., 0,
7, 15, 15, 7, 12, 5]. During initial iterations, we conrmed
that padding the end of the sequence made no dierence when
compared with padding the beginning of the sequence. Rather than
a common embedding for all deep learning models, the embedding
is learned by the model during training. e outputs from each
deep learning model is a score, a single oat between zero and one.
is value indicates the model’s condence that the domain was
generated by a dictionary DGA.
We compare our main model, Bilbo, against four models adapted
from state-of-the-art architectures: a single layer ANN, a CNN, an
LSTM, and MIT’s Hybrid [49, 56]. e code for each model is in Ap-
pendix A. As mentioned in Section 2.2, deep learning models have
frequently been shown to outperform feature-based approaches for
DGA detection and are capable of millisecond scoring speeds. Be-
cause of these ideal characteristics for a dictionary DGA detection
system, Bilbo is only compared to other deep learning architectures.
All models were built in Keras [45] using the TensorFlow [2]
backend on a MacBook Pro to convey the ease for model retraining
and that models can be deployed on smaller cloud servers. Each
model is trained three times for ten epochs with a batch size of 512.
5.2.1 Artificial Neural Network (ANN). is fundamental model
architecture underlies both the CNN and LSTM. As a baseline for
this study, similar to Yu et al. [56], we include a single-layer ANN
with 100 neurons in its hidden layer during our testing and con-
sideration. is architecture is also included within Bilbo as the
conjoining layer for the parallel CNN and the LSTM component
architectures.
5.2.2 Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Network. is architec-
ture is a slight adaptation on the LSTM used by Woodbridge et
al. [50]. Because it was tuned for a slightly dierent task, we re-
evaluated some of its hyperparameters. From our automated grid
search of hyperparameters, as shown in Figure 4, it was clear that
increasing LSTM layer size improved our accuracy on the testing
set for generic binary classication. We found that an LSTM layer
of 256 nodes provided us with the highest accuracy on the testing
dataset without loss to its performance in real-time deployments.
e only alterations to the original model were the input param-
eters to match our standard across models and doubling the size
of the LSTM layer. is is the same architecture implemented as a
component within Bilbo.
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Table 2: Samples of identied dictionary DGA domains with the top 50 scores from our holdout set from each component
model (LSTM and CNN) and our hybrid, Bilbo. Blue are domains seen initially in the LSTM’s top 50 samples and then in
Bilbo’s top 50 samples. Same for the yellow domains, but seen in the CNN samples and then in Bilbo’s samples. Orange is a
domain that appeared in dierent ranks within all three models.
LSTM CNN → Bilbo
alexandreaannabeth themshallsubjectbeenathe deforrestharrelson
withinlaughter deforrestharrelson gwendolynchristopherson
gwendolynchristopherson harrietteharrelson kimberleepatterson
kimberleighharoldson kimberleepatterson kimberleighharoldson
themshallsubjectbeenathe severallaughter oughtinterrupttrotheth
walkjuly decemberheight themshallsubjectbeenathe
Figure 4: Graph of hyperparameter grid search used to in-
form decisions on the LSTM architecture. e LSTM layer
size and optimiser are compared for accuracy on the test
set, demonstrating improved performance using larger net-
works and either the adam or rmsprop optimiser.
5.2.3 Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). We followed Saxe
et al.’s parallel convolution structure [38] to compare with state-of-
the-art with a CNN. Aer testing a variety of lter sizes individually,
combinations of various lters were also analysed to nd the best
architecture for our task. Based LCS analysis for each family, thema-
jority of substrings within dictionary DGAs appeared to be within
the range of two to six characters. is model’s nal architecture
includes ve dierent sizes (2-6 characters) of convolutions, 60
lters of each length with a stride of one character, and pooling
later concatenated to provide a vast amount of information towards
the nal score. is architecture balances the model complexity
against the prediction accuracy on our training set.
5.2.4 Bilbo. Our initial results with the individual LSTM and
CNN, as seen in Table 2, indicated each model was learning relevant
but distinct characteristics for accurate identication of dictionary
DGAs. Bilbo’s architecture ”bags” the extracted features from the
LSTM and CNN with a hidden layer of 100 nodes, from which a
nal prediction is rendered. is hybrid model learns to balance
the features extracted by both the LSTM and CNN. e same archi-
tectures described previously for the individual ANN, LSTM, and
CNN are combined to form Bilbo. is model is the rst parallel
usage of a CNN and LSTM hybrid for DGA detection.
5.2.5 MIT HybridModel. Based on the original encoder-decoder
model presented by MIT [49], several recent publications have
adapted this CNN-LSTM hybrid model to DGA classication [30,
43, 56]. Unlike our model, this uses the CNN convolutions to feed
inputs into an LSTM. e MIT hybrid architecture adapted by Yu
et al. [56] is another benchmark during testing. Comparing Bilbo’s
parallel usage of a CNN and an LSTM to this model demonstrates
the signicance of our parallel architecture in binary classication
of dictionary DGAs.
eir single convolutional layer consists of 128 one-dimensional
lters, each three characters long with a stride of one. is is
fed into a Max Pooling layer before a 64-node LSTM. is model
contains no drop out and relies on a single sigmoid to aen the
results to a single score.
5.3 Metrics for Comparison
Considering real-world applications for DGA detection, a balance
between incorrect domains and lack of condence for true dictio-
nary DGA domains must be found. To help measure each model’s
performance for this, three core metrics are calculated to summarise
common metrics used in machine learning research. e rst is
the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
(AUC), which measures the model’s ability to detect true positives
as a function of the false positive rate. Maximising AUC means
improving labelling of both positive and negative samples. e sec-
ond is accuracy; how well the model scored positive and negative
labels our of all samples in the holdout set. Finally, the F1 score is
the harmonic mean of precision and recall, giving insight to the
context of true positive labels within the holdout set.
Using abbreviations for true positive (TP), true negative (TN),
false positive (FP), false negative (FN), true positive rate (TPR), and
false positive rate (FPR), these are computed in the following ways:
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Precision =
∑
TP∑
TP +
∑
FP
Recall =
∑
TP∑
TP +
∑
FN
F1 = 2 ∗ Precision ∗ Recall
Precision + Recall
Accuracy =
∑
TP +
∑
TN∑
TP +
∑
FP +
∑
TN +
∑
FN
TPR =
∑
TP∑
TP +
∑
FN
FPR =
∑
FP∑
FP +
∑
TN
Consistency of the core metrics in every seing is key to nd-
ing the best performer while evaluating models on labelled data.
To quantify this, the core metrics are treated as assessment ques-
tions: one point of consistency is awarded to each of the top three
models within every core metric. e model with the most points
across testing classication and generalisability is deemed the most
consistent performing model.
6 RESULTS
In this section, we elaborate on the values of metrics from each
model resulting from each test. e threshold for a label for every
test was 0.5. Overall, the priority is to accurately apply both positive
and negative labels to the dataset. From these tests, the model with
the best consistency score is viewed as the best for deploying into
real world seings.
6.1 Results of Testing Classication
e values for the metrics from this test are provided in Table 3.
In this test, the ANN is signicantly worse than the specialised
deep learning models in every metric, according to a student t-test
with 95% condence on the all collected results. e ANN’s FPR of
0.1953 is almost a whole magnitude worse than MIT’s FPR, which
was the best.
e CNN and LSTM are statistically similar in all metrics with
the LSTM outperforming the CNN in most precision, TPR, and
FPR. is is due to the imbalance between the dictionary DGA
families, with suppobox comprising of about 78% of the malicious
samples. During our substring analysis, we found that suppobox
contained the longest substrings, revealing that models which learn
the long sequence of suppobox’s dictionary words would have
an advantage when classifying the majority of dictionary DGA
domains. e LSTM is designed to learn sequential relationships
between characters rather than subsets of characters like the CNN.
is is why the LSTM beats the CNN and, as shown in Table 6, is a
consistent leader in the core metrics.
Both MIT’s hybrid model and Bilbo perform the best across
all metrics. e dierence between the two is insignicant in all
metrics, diering less than 0.01 for the F1 score, Accuracy, and AUC.
is near identical performance is similar to the LSTM and CNN
comparison earlier. ere is also a paern in most of the metrics
that when the CNN is beer than the LSTM, Bilbo is beer than the
MIT model and vice versa. MIT’s parameters are mostly dedicated
to the LSTM layer, explaining the similar performance between the
two models.
Bilbo consistently performs between or beer than its compo-
nent models in all metrics by regularising the performance of the
LSTM and CNN with an ANN, displaying the expected results of
our parallel architecture. In the empirical analysis of the results, the
top scoring domains from both the CNN and LSTM were present
in the nal scoring of Bilbo as expected.
e dierence between the deep learning models, excluding the
ANN, in this test is very small. Given a domain name, they are
all successful at labelling dictionary DGA domains from benign
domains aer learning from three diverse dictionary DGA families.
e consistency scores for this test place the LSTM model, the MIT
model, and Bilbo as the best performers.
6.2 Results of Testing Generalisability
As presented in Table 4, the metrics have been limited to three core
metrics to maximise for best overall performance. A model’s AUC
indicates the model’s likelihood of correctly classifying a sample as
a positive or negative. e F1 score conveys how well the model
correctly labels dictionary DGA domains with regard to those that
should be or were labelled. Accuracy states how well the model
labelled the data within this particular holdout set.
e values for the core metrics were not expected to surpass
0.9 due to the dierences between each dictionary DGA family.
Analysis of each family’s LCS and the JW scores between families
not depicted in this paper stated some families overlap more with
one family than another. is dependence inuences each model’s
performance by limiting its ability to generalise unless certain
families have been seen before. Hence the values across this table
are lower than in Table 3.
e ANN outperforms the other models in this task with higher
core metrics in two of the trials. However, it also only surpasses
the other models when matsnu or gozi are part of the training set.
Figure 2 depicts a large overlap in their LCS. is could explain
what the ANN is able to learn for beer performance on new DGAs
when either matsnu or gozi is in the training set and the other is
in the testing set.
e next most consistent performer in this test is the CNN. Its
training on smaller character windows allows it to excel when
applied to new dictionary DGAs. Based on earlier data analysis, the
most frequent LCS in every family were three to four characters
and typically overlapped. e large overlap in LCS between matsnu
and gozi reinforce these short substrings, explaining why the CNN
outperforms others when both matsnu and gozi are in the training
set.
6.3 Results of Testing Time-based Resiliency
e nal test is on a single day’s worth of recent domain samples
from each of the dictionary DGA families already considered. Listed
are the ratios of true positives out of the total number of samples
for that dictionary DGA family. Total samples for each family
are as follows: 1325 from gozi, 686 from matsnu, and 4257 from
suppobox.
Using all of the trained models from the classication test, the
average scores are listed. e results are close between all model
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Table 3: (Testing Classication) Comparing the results of ve dierent deep learning architectures for binary dictionary-DGA
classication. e labelled training and testing set are composed of a random selection from all three dictionary DGA families.
e best of each column is in bold.
Model Recall Precision F1 Score TPR FPR AUC Accuracy
ANN 0.9077 0.8250 0.8644 0.8250 0.1953 0.9290 0.8566
CNN 0.9730 0.9473 0.9600 0.9473 0.0545 0.9919 0.9593
LSTM 0.9675 0.9627 0.9651 0.9627 0.0370 0.9932 0.9653
MIT 0.9583 0.9710 0.9646 0.9710 0.0282 0.9946 0.9651
Bilbo 0.9766 0.9557 0.9660 0.9557 0.0454 0.9944 0.9656
Table 4: (Testing Generalisability) Comparing the results of deep learning architecture for generalisability of dictionary DGA
classication. As documented for each trial, the top row lists the training dictionary DGA families with an arrow going to the
testing family. e best of each column is in bold.
Model matsnu + suppobox→ gozi matsnu + gozi→ suppobox gozi + suppobox→ matsnu
AUC F1 Accuracy AUC F1 Accuracy AUC F1 Accuracy
ANN 0.8347 0.7465 0.7514 0.7728 0.5858 0.6665 0.7805 0.7033 0.7230
CNN 0.9129 0.5881 0.6954 0.8140 0.5909 0.6855 0.8180 0.5038 0.6537
LSTM 0.8797 0.4066 0.6149 0.7556 0.6010 0.6739 0.8414 0.3189 0.5862
MIT 0.8971 0.3923 0.6103 0.7616 0.5379 0.6612 0.8439 0.4600 0.6336
Bilbo 0.9137 0.5357 0.6708 0.8032 0.5660 0.6729 0.8309 0.4218 0.6217
Table 5: (Testing Time-based Resiliency) Ratio correct at
scoring dictionary DGAs from each family within the sam-
ple from November 2019. e best of each column is in bold.
Fully-Trained Model matsnu suppobox gozi
ANN 0.8746 0.9204 0.9517
CNN 0.8732 0.9962 0.9585
LSTM 0.8936 0.9522 0.9426
MIT 0.8790 0.9976 0.9386
Bilbo 0.9023 0.9962 0.9472
Table 6: Consistency scores from each of the tests (1 = classi-
cation, 2 = generalisability, 3 = time-based resiliency) and
the overall result. Calculated by counting the number of
times each model was top three for a core metric. e best
of each column is in bold.
Model Test 1 + Test 2 + Test 3 = Overall
ANN 0 6 0 6
CNN 0 8 1 9
LSTM 3 3 0 6
MIT 3 4 1 8
Bilbo 3 6 1 10
architectures and, when averaged, are close to the accuracy seen
during testing. As for the relative decrease in accuracy for matsnu
and gozi, this is due to the class imbalance between the dictionary
DGA families in the dataset. Regardless of which model selected for
deployment, it will need to be updated frequently with new labelled
data whenever trusted and available to increase this accuracy on
future dictionary DGA domains.
roughout all of these tests, each state-of-the-art deep learning
model achieves top metrics. To determine which is the best, we
consider the application environment the model is to be deployed
in and its need for a consistent well-performing model. Aer ag-
gregating the consistency points for the top performers from every
core metric in each test and trial, presented in Table 6, Bilbo is
found to be the most consistent and capable model for deploying
within real-world dictionary DGA detection systems.
7 REAL-WORLD DEPLOYMENT
Once Bilbo was trained, tested, and validated using open source
data from the Alexa Top 1 Million [5] and DGArchive [13], we
evaluated performance in a live system. We deployed the model on
a cluster of servers to be queried by a data pipeline and applied the
model to live network trac from a large enterprise.
7.1 Implementation at the Corporate Level
Within corporate environments, a large security information and
event management (SIEM) system is typically used to centralise
and process relevant data sources. Security analysts use the SIEM
for their daily work to investigate suspicious activity within their
environment. e data they view is limited by a series of lters and
joins they apply on various datasets.
To productionise Bilbo in a high-throughput environment gen-
erating hundreds of domains per second, we developed a model as
a service framework. is framework promotes scalability, modu-
larity, and ease of maintenance. Client systems processing domain
names, such as the SIEM, make requests of the model servers to
receive scores on new domains. is communication is performed
using gRPC, Google’s library for remote procedure calls [17], which
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Figure 5: ree stages of the updating process for our Model as a Service (MAAS) Architecture for model deployments to
be accessible to SIEM and other client systems. From le to right, the rst stage shows clients interacting through the load
balancer with old model servers. To update the servers, we spin up new model servers with the latest version and conrm
production readiness before attaching them to the load balancer. Finally, the old model servers are deleted, leaving the new
model servers in their place. At no point during this process will the clients be unable to receive scores from our models.
was selected for its speed over methods like REST (Representa-
tional State Transfer). e communication from client to server
is language-agnostic, allowing a client wrien in Java or Scala to
interface seamlessly with our Python model.
A load balancer manages trac to the model servers and only the
load balancer endpoint is exposed to the client. is allows multiple
clients to reach out to a single location in order to receive scores
from the model. Any number of model servers can run behind the
load balancer, but these details are abstracted away from the clients,
who only interface with the load balancer endpoint. is allows
us to increase and decrease the size of the model server cluster in
response to changing without interrupting service; such scaling
can be congured to take place automatically in response to metrics
like CPU utilisation.
While our model does not learn inline, its predictions, combined
with a ground truth label provided by an analyst, can be used to
retrain the model, allowing it to learn from mistakes and improve
its predictive power. us, we need to be able to deploy a retrained
model frequently and with low overhead. Since the model server
cluster is behind a load balancer, we can make this change without
shuing down the service. We simply put additional model servers
(running the newest model) behind the load balancer, and, once
they have been conrmed to run successfully, remove the model
servers running an outdated version. e model update process
can be seen in Figure 5. Along with their scores, the model servers
return the version of the model that they are running; this is helpful
in evaluating our models over time and in distinguishing between
models during the brief overlap period when two versions of the
model are running behind the load balancer.
Several key design decisions allow us to handle requests to the
service at very large scale. While gRPC minimises network latency
by allowing bi-directional streaming between the client and server,
the calls to our service are still time-intensive, so we built in a
bloom lter caching mechanism on the client side to avoid this
boleneck. is more intelligent client only reaches out to the
server if it receives a domain that it has not recently seen before.
Our analysis of domain trac revealed that only 15% of domains are
unique in an hour of trac; this optimisation dramatically reduces
the workload of our model server cluster.
We evaluated Bilbo based on its processing capacity and its
ndings, as seen below. Our initial prototype consisted of a single
client reaching out to a load balancer with a single server in the
cloud. With an unoptimized compilation of Tensorow for our
backend, the fastest scoring averaged to approximately 10 ms per
record, increasing linearly with an increasing number of requests.
If we anticipate 1000 domains per second, our model only needs to
be hosted on 10 servers. On a Cloud service such as Amazon Web
Services, we can keep a ten-node cluster running for less than y
cents (USD) per hour.
7.2 Results in Enterprise Trac
For further model performance testing, Bilbo is evaluated on real-
world network trac. Randomly selecting one window of trac
from August 14th, 2017, and another window of trac from Novem-
ber 15th, 20173. Each network sample set contains domain names
over a two-hour period. Aer parsing the domain names from the
URLs in the logs, the August and November data contained 20,000
and 45,000 unique domains, respectively.
Since we lack ground truth for the domains in our captured sam-
ples to validate our results, we pulled in additional information for
each domain. First, we included the action decision of the proxy,
which denies domains that are known to be malicious. Second, we
added scores from VirusTotal [41], a site that aggregates blacklists
to provide reputation scores for domains and is commonly used
by security analysts for evaluation of domains (accessed Novem-
ber, 2017). Note that both the proxy and VirusTotal are imperfect
since they are unaware of malicious content related to a domain
until thorough analysis has been performed, which can take many
weeks [26]. We cross-referenced the high scores from our model
with the results from the proxy and VirusTotal to perform a basic
investigation.
Feeding our model only the domain names, we discovered a
series of domains with similar naming paerns:
• cot.aacksspaghei[.]com/as
• kqw.rediscussedcudgels[.]com/as
• psl.substratumlter[.]com/as
3ese were recent dates when the model was initially developed for dictionary DGA
detection.
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Figure 6: (Created December 2017) reatCrowd network
graph of the domain “boilingbeetle” discovered in enter-
prise proxy trac by the ensemble model. is domain is
connected through select IP addresses to other domains of
similar structure, in the pattern of a command and control
network.
• dot.masticationlamest[.]com/as
At a glance, these domains follow an algorithmic paern of three
characters, two words, and the “/as” ending, making them strong
candidate dictionary-based DGA domains. Upon further examina-
tion, all of these domains were queried by the same machine, which,
prior to our discovery, had been deactivated due to complaints of in-
credibly sluggish performance. is is highly suggestive of malware
activity using a dictionary DGA network.
Additionally, we found four domains, each representing distinct
suspicious networks matching the expected paern for dictionary-
based DGA C&C hubs:
• boilingbeetle
• silkenthreadiness
• mountaintail
• nervoussummer
Each of these networks, when visualised by reatCrowd, a crowd-
sourced network analysis “system for nding and researching arte-
facts relating to cyber threats” [6], are shown to be comprised of
domains that are made up of two or more unrelated words, all re-
solving to the same IP address, in the paern of a domain-uxing
dictionary DGA. e “boilingbeetle” network is shown in Figure
6. ese domains and their related networks were not agged by
the online blacklists used by VirusTotal; only some of the domains
within each network were blocked by the proxy.
Further investigation noted that these networks are for advertise-
ment trac, indicating that dictionary DGA techniques are being
used to bypass ad-blocker mechanisms. Although not apparently
malicious, these ve discoveries of dictionary-based DGA from
potential malware, found in only a few hours of proxy log data,
demonstrates that our solution is able to ag relevant results in live
trac.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we present a parallel hybrid architecture named Bilbo,
composed of an LSTM, a CNN, and an ANN, for dictionary DGA
detection. Dictionary DGAs bypass most general, manually-dened
DGA defences and are harder to detect due to their natural language
characteristics. Bilbo is compared to state-of-the-art deep learning
models adapted for dictionary DGA classication and evaluated on
consistency over AUC, Accuracy, and F1 score. Overall, Bilbo is the
most consistent and capable model available.
Bilbo was then applied to a large nancial corporation’s SIEM,
providing inline predictions within a scalable framework to han-
dle high-throughput network trac. During investigations, our
model’s scores were used to lter data and ag suspicious activity
for further analysis.
When applied to several hours of live network logs, Bilbo suc-
cessfully classied trac matching the expected network paern:
a single IP address hosting several domain names that make no
semantic sense and follow a trend of English words put together.
Although the identied domains from the network logs were not
botnets or worms reaching out to a C&C, which are very rare,
Bilbo was able to identify dictionary DGAs used by advertisement
networks and other applications with potential malicious intent.
Later improvements include the continued reduction of false pos-
itives and applying natural language processing (NLP) techniques.
One method to reduce false positives would be to consider layering
a generative model to determine if the input domain is similar to
any data Bilbo has seen before. is could increase or decrease the
score, or add another lter to alter a user’s condence in the score.
Applicable NLP techniques detect anomalous word combinations
in domains by scoring the likelihood words would be collocated.
is could prove fruitful for DGA detection but heavily depends on
the corpus for parsing out words and gathering initial collocation
information to understand for a baseline of what is normal.
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A MODEL ARCHITECTURES
All code can be found at this Github repository:.
hps://github.com/jinxmirror13/bilbo-bagging-hybrid
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